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The religious expert in American courts
Introduction
Expertise is a problem for Americans. Particularly academic expertise; and
particularly in public matters. Expertise is considered elitist, and is suspect for
that reason, but, more fundamentally, expertise is understood to serve other
masters, masters other than the people. Expertise is viewed as un-democratic. 1
One does want one’s doctor to be an expert in the disease for which she is
treating you, but one does not want political matters to be decided by experts.
Expertise in law falls between these two. One does want experts in DNA analysis
to be available in court cases, for the most part, unless it costs the public too
much or is too focused on the exoneration of criminals, but the prejudice is that
most issues of fact in the courts in the United States are best not decided by
experts. 2 There is an interesting, perhaps ironic, convergence here between pop-
ular prejudice and the conclusions of sociologists of knowledge. 3
1. The classic work on this topic is the much-debated Richard Hofstadter, Anti-
Intellectualism in American Life, New York, Vintage Books, 1966.
2. This prejudice is also true of legislative legal work. Hence the popularity of laws written
by popular vote, such as the awkwardly worded, even incoherent, amendment to the Oklahoma
Constitution adopted in the November 2010 election. Question 755 amended the Oklahoma
Constitution as follows:
B. Subsection C of this section shall be known as the “Save Our State Amendment”.
C. The Courts provided for in subsection A of this section, when exercising their judicial
authority, shall uphold and adhere to the law as provided in the United States Constitution,
the Oklahoma Constitution, the United States Code, federal regulations promulgated pursuant
thereto, established common law, the Oklahoma Statutes and rules promulgated pursuant
thereto, and if necessary the law of another state of the United States provided the law of the
other state does not include Sharia Law, in making judicial decisions. The courts shall not look
to the legal precepts of other nations or cultures. Specifically, the courts shall not consider
international or Sharia Law. The provisions of this subsection shall apply to all cases before
the respective courts including, but not limited to, cases of first impression.
It is less a law than a salvo in the culture wars.
3. For a discussion of epistemological issues, generally, with respect to expert evidence,
see Gary Edmond, “Whigs in Court: Historiographical Problems with Expert Evidence”, Yale
Journal of Law and Humanities, 14, 2002, 123-75. For an empirical analysis of judicial atti-
tudes toward academic expertise, see Henry F. Fradellaa, “A Content Analysis of Federal Judi-
cial Views of the Social Science ‘Researcher’s Black Arts”, Rutgers Law Journal 35, Fall 2003,
103-170.
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This essay will consider how this US political and social style is exemplified
by the problem of expertise about religion in the context of the American court-
room. The United States is a profoundly do-it-yourself society, not only in poli-
tics, but also in religion. After the Revolution, the western part of the country
was evangelized, for the most part, by part-time preachers lacking a seminary
education, who spoke from the heart and from largely untutored readings of the
Bible. As Mark Noll argues in The Scandal of the Evangelical Mind, 4 a book
that arguably describes not just the minds of evangelicals but the minds of most
Americans, Americans have come to prefer a style of public engagement which
is characterized by a distinctive combination of magical thinking and practical
positivism. While not anti-clerical in the European sense, Americans tend toward
a religion that is experiential and expressive rather than intellectual, and in which
religious authority is located in the individual, wherever one is located along the
political or theological spectrum.
The essay will consider, first, briefly, legal rules governing expert evidence,
and then, second, consider how evidence about religion functions in US courts,
using examples from cases under both the Free Exercise and Establishment
clauses of the First Amendment to the US constitution. These cases will be used
to illustrate the political and epistemological predicament of such expertise in
American courts.
The Rules of Evidence
It is important, and helpful, first, to put the problem of the religious expert
in the wider context of expert witnessing in US courts, an enterprise that is in
a state of serious re-examination at the present time. The US is unusual, even
among common law jurisdictions, in the extent to which it continues to rely
on juries in both civil and criminal matters. Indeed, the rules that govern the
presentation of evidence in trials in the United States presuppose a jury, even
when no jury is present. 5 This bias toward the jury trial as exemplary signifi-
cantly affects the form and style of evidence presented. The bias is for perceptual
evidence given in public in court in the first person. It is believed always prefe-
rable for the jury—or the judge as fact-finder—to see and hear the witness first-
hand, and to see and hear the witness being cross-examined, so that the jury—or
4. Mark Noll, The Scandal of the Evangelical Mind, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1995.
5. This is the case notwithstanding the fact that less than 1% of American trials are jury
trials: The data provide a picture of trends in the state courts that overall bear an unmistakable
resemblance to the trends in federal courts we have been examining. The portion of cases
reaching jury trial declined from 1.8% to 0.6% of dispositions and bench trials fell from 34.3%
to 15.2%. The absolute number of jury trials is down by one-third and the absolute number
of bench trials is down 6.6%. Marc Galanter “The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials
and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts”, J. Empirical Legal Studies, 1, 2004, 459-570.
For an exemplary account of the nature of the trial and of the adversary process in the United
States, see Robert P. Burns, A Theory of the Trial, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1999.
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judge—can evaluate the reliability of the testimony herself, using primarily com-
mon sense reasoning. All evidence that deviates from this preferred standard,
whether documentary, physical, or “scientific”, labors under a presumptive
handicap. Expert evidence of any kind is thus suspect because it depends on a
factual record, as well as disciplinary training and practices, which are located
outside the courtroom and therefore largely unavailable to testing before the
trier of fact through cross-examination. Expert testimony may also introduce
facts and analysis that were not available to the legislator or which support
statutory interpretation at odds with the legislator’s intention. Finally, and criti-
cally, the actual delivery of expert testimony may demand of the expert a level of
certainty or a form of expression that is inappropriate to the expert’s knowledge,
tempting the expert to deliver her opinion in a language and forum foreign to
her field of expertise.
The basic evidentiary standards in American trials are logical relevance and
materiality. 6 “Materiality requires that the fact any bit of evidence is offered to
prove have significance given the legal rule established by the substantive law
and provided in the jury instruction. Logical relevance requires that the evidence
offered have some logical force in changing the probability of a material fact.” 7
Unless there is a specific exception, all relevant evidence is admissible. 8 Relevant
evidence includes testimonial, documentary, and physical evidence concerning
the events that gave rise to the litigation, but also testimony and reports by
experts that can “assist” the judge and the jury in understanding the evidence.
Two rules primarily govern expert testimony in US Federal Courts, Federal
Rules of Evidence 702,703:
Rule 702. Testimony by Experts
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact [judge
or jury] to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto
in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient
facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and
(3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
Rule 703. Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the
6. The actual rules of the law of evidence in US courts differ by jurisdiction. In this essay,
for the sake of simplicity, I will be speaking of the evidentiary rules in federal courts. Significant
differences exist in and among state courts. The US Constitution also provides some limits as
to what evidence can be introduced, particularly in the 5th and 6th amendments. Common law
rules of evidence also continue to inform the interpretation of both federal and state codes. For
an introduction to the American law of evidence, see Graham C. Lilly, Principles of Evidence,
Minneapolis, West Publishing, 2006.
7. Robert P. Burns, “Social Science and the Ways of the Trial Court: Possibilities of Trans-
lation”, in E. Mertz and W. Ford, (eds.), The Process of Translation: Law, Social Science, and
New Legal Realism, forthcoming, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011.
8. Federal Rules of Evidence, 402.
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hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming
opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in
evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts or data that are
otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the
opinion or inference unless the court determines that their probative value in assisting
the jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.
As the language of the rules implies, federal judges in the US are generally
understood to have broad discretion in admitting a wide spectrum of what is
called “expert” testimony, particularly in bench trials. 9 They may do so “[i]f
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
[judge or jury] to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” In
practice, judges admit a very wide range of so-called “expert” testimony, on
road conditions, on medical treatment, on the psychology of criminals and wit-
nesses, on safety standards, etc. The witnesses providing such testimony may or
may not have academic qualifications. It is usually enough if they have some
specialized knowledge, even if that knowledge is based in long experience rather
than in academic training.
There is increasing concern today, given the technological complexity of our
lived environment, as to the capacity of jurors and judges to assess the profes-
sional competence of experts and to understand and properly evaluate expert
“scientific” testimony. 10 Much has been written about the deleterious effect of
what is sometimes called “junk science”. 11 These legal issues naturally also take
their place within a wider intellectual focus on epistemology today.
Formally speaking, the US trial judge is understood to act as “gatekeeper”
with respect to expert evidence. The judge decides whether the evidentiary rules
with respect to the admissibility of expert evidence have been met, both as to
the expert’s qualifications and as to whether the evidence itself meets the require-
ments of the rules as to whether it is relevant and “reliable”—that is, whether
it is indeed scientific. The jury decides whether such evidence is credible and
determines the weight to be given it. Beginning in the middle of the twentieth
century, the accepted judicial standard for the admission of scientific evidence
was that it had to be based in “science” that was “accepted in the scientific
community.” 12 Today, in most US jurisdictions, that conservative standard of
9. A bench trial is a trial without a jury, increasingly common in the US.
10. Some argue that more highly technical matters should be decided by specially trained
judges, as are patent matters, for example, rather than by regular civil courts. But this is not
an entirely new concern. See Learned Hand, “Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding
Expert Testimony”, Harvard Law Review, 15, 1901, 40-58.
11. For a particularly egregious example of the devastating effect of the introduction of
incompetent expert testimony, see the description of an arson prosecution in a recent New
Yorker article. David Grann, “Trial by Fire: Did Texas Execute an Innocent Man?” The New
Yorker, September 7, 2009, 42-63. On this case and other persistent issues in the administration
of criminal justice in Texas, see gritsforbreakfast blog at http://gritsforbreakfast.blogspot.com/
search/label/Todd%20Willingham (accessed June 14, 2011).
12. This standard is known as the Frye rule. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (DC
Cir. 1923).
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reliability has been replaced with a theoretically more open-ended and forward-
thinking standard that asks whether the evidence has being produced using the
scientific “method.” 13 Whether this new standard is an improvement, that is,
whether it enables the introduction of more useful evidence and whether judges
and juries are any better at evaluating this kind of science, is controversial among
both academics and lawyers.
Expert testimony in American courts is also distinctive in that it is offered
within the context of the adversary trial. Generally speaking, expert testimony
in trials in the United States is presented by one of the parties as a part of that
party’s case. The expert is cross-examined by the opposing attorney in front of
the jury—or judge. The rules permit a judge to call her own experts but that
rarely happens. It is common, thus, in US trials for there to be what is sometimes
called “dueling experts”. In other words, for example, as to any particular issue
in a legal case, such as the correctness of a decision made by a doctor with
respect to a patient’s treatment, a medical expert will be presented by each party,
one offering the opinion that the doctor’s decision was not coincident with best
medical practice, and the other offering the opinion that it was. Each side, then,
presents one or more experts and judges and juries must decide which expert to
believe. Both judges and juries are placed in a situation in which they are called
upon to arbitrate among competing academic and scientific theories and methods
in deciding what expertise will “assist” them in their determination of the facts.
And “science” is thus presented as something which itself is an adversary enter-
prise. It is not uncommon for the very competition itself to undermine the
authority of the expert and to call into question the entire enterprise of expert
witnessing.
As a general matter, the evidentiary rules governing expert testimony have
developed in the two most frequent types of US trials, personal injury cases and
criminal cases, although experts are used in many different kinds of trials. Politi-
cal concern has been expressed that in personal injury trials too many plaintiffs
are winning large jury awards based in shoddy scientific evidence offered by
persons who are professional trial experts without strong continuing scientific
lab experience and knowledge, while, in criminal cases, defense attorneys increas-
ingly routinely use expert testimony to challenge the reliability of the scientific
basis of forensic evidence, including, for example, even long-accepted fingerprint
and hand-writing evidence, thereby undermining prosecutors’ cases. 14 The his-
tory of the use of DNA evidence is particularly instructive as it has moved within
the last decade from never allowed to almost universally acceptable. Statutes
providing a right to state-funded DNA evidence for indigent clients are being
promoted.
13. This rule is derived from the Daubert decision. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals, 522 US 136, 1997.
14. For a discussion of new types of forensic science and existing evidentiary law see, for
example, Erin Murphy, “The New Forensics: Criminal Justice, False Certainty, and the Second
Generation of Scientific Evidence”, California Law Review, 95, 2007, 721-797.
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Most evidentiary law about expert testimony presupposes a model of expert
knowledge based primarily in the natural sciences. While there are serious episte-
mological difficulties with natural science evidence and issues about the capacity
of judges and juries to evaluate all expert evidence, qualitative social-scientific, or
humanistic, rather than natural scientific or quantitative social-scientific, expert
testimony has always fit uneasily within this body of law. 15 While positivist
understandings of law and positivist understandings of the natural sciences may
seem to come together comfortably, the range of both disciplinary approaches
and types of evidence in the humanities and qualitative social sciences makes
courts more uneasy. Persistent issues include the qualifications of experts, the
methods they use, and the kinds of opinions they can give. Social scientific and
humanistic knowledge about human behavior is seen to be much closer to the
kinds of common sense judgments that are reserved for the jury or judge and to
blur the lines of authority. At the extreme, the very relevance of such knowledge
is at issue.
The form of testimony is also an issue. In some courts, experts testify both
through written reports and through in-court spoken testimony. The written
report is often cast in the form of an affidavit, a form of lawspeak that demands
a declarative style which enacts a level of certainty about matters with which
many academic experts are uncomfortable. In-court testimony presents other
issues. Testifying in response to questions from lawyers makes it difficult for
experts to fill out and qualify their testimony in a way that both fits with their
disciplinary epistemology and is ultimately persuasive. The very narratives that
justify the opinion are often excluded. The legal question will rarely be exactly
parallel to the expert’s research question. It is in the gap between the two that
the question of relevance and materiality falls. Finally, cross-examination often
focuses on distracting and sometimes extraneous efforts to catch up the expert in
small contradictions or ambiguities—or even contrived deficiencies of training—
without the possibility of full explanation.
Religion expertise
Who is an expert on religion? Some religious traditions have built-in experts,
that is, they have elders or theologians or shamans, persons with knowledge and
office with whom political authorities have historically consulted or negotiated,
15. For a discussion of evidence on gender differences in an employment discrimination
case, see Joan Scott, “The Sears Case”, in Gender and the Politics of Difference, New York,
Columbia University Press, 1999. For classic discussions of the anthropologist as expert witness
in US courts, see Lawrence Rosen, “The Anthropologist as Expert Witness” American Anthropo-
logist, 79, september 1977, 555-578; James Clifford, “Identity in Mashpee”, in James Clifford,
(ed.), The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art,
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1988, 277-348.
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and to whom they have sometimes submitted, about religion that comes into
conflict with governance. Some modern states have offices or ministries that fill
this function, either formal remnants of earlier established churches or the vari-
ous hybrid descendants of such churches, but growing religious diversity (or
perhaps more accurately growing acknowledgment of religious diversity) contin-
ues to challenge the practicality of such efforts. 16 For countries with strong
separationist or secularist commitments, and radically egalitarian religious com-
munities, such as the US, states in which such a government ministerial function
is lacking, expertise in religion is often diffuse and unorganized and accessed by
government on a piecemeal basis. Such expertise may even be rejected as inher-
ently illiberal so that what counts as religion comes to be defined in pseudo-
scientific or vernacular terms.
The US has no centralized office for regulating religion and no single defini-
tion of religion for legal purposes. Neither do the individual states. Within the
very broad and often ambiguous and contradictory parameters set by the
Supreme Court, individual agencies at the state and federal level, including taxing
authorities, correctional institutions, the military services, zoning authorities,
law enforcement, etc., make their own decisions about what counts as religion
for the purpose of implementing the thousands of US laws that take account of
religion. This practical lack of consensus about what counts as expertise in reli-
gion is exacerbated by the lack of consensus among those who study religion in
the US as to what counts as religion. Notwithstanding this lack of agreement
and the decentralized decision-making about religion by legal authorities in the
US, however, religion experts have testified in American trials for a long time,
Christian theologians, as well as academic scholars of various religious tradi-
tions, and of comparative religions—historians, sociologists and anthropologists.
They testify in every kind of case, civil and criminal.
Religion may become a material issue in US law cases founded in the religion
clauses of the First Amendment to the US Constitution, 17 in those founded in
the thousands of federal, state, and local statutes that explicitly make religion
relevant, including conscience clauses providing health care workers the right to
refuse to serve in certain kinds of circumstances, and in a further class of cases
in which one of the parties makes religion relevant, such as in the probate of a
will or in a child custody case—or even in the case of what is sometimes called
16. See the following essay describing the efforts of modern states to manage religion
through government ministries: Tim Jensen, “When is Religion, Religion and a Knife, a
Knife—and Who Decides? The Case of Denmark”; Markus Dressler, “The Religio-Secular
Continuum, or Secular Law as a Theological Discourse in Turkey”, in W. F. Sullivan, R. A. Yelle,
and M. Taussig-Rubbo, (eds.), After Secular Law, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2011.
17. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in relevant part,
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof...”
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the cultural defense in a criminal trial. A largely dispersed and ad hoc set of
practices governs the admissibility of experts on religion in these cases. For the
most part, because competent teaching about religion is rare in public schools in
the US, 18 and because expertise in religion is constitutionally suspect, American
lawyers and judges are generally poorly educated about religion and they have
little capacity to understand religious issues as they pertain to legal questions,
to competently present or evaluate them in court, or to select and interact with
religious experts.
Because of the ambivalence of Americans with respect to expertise in religion,
because of their general unfamiliarity with the social scientific study of religion,
and because any and all defining of religion by US law is unconstitutionally
establishmentarian, the argument has been made that expertise about religion is
simply not necessary. 19 A person’s constitutional right to determine his own
religious identity, it is said, proscribes the use of expert testimony on such a
subject. Yet expert testimony about religion is, in fact, often offered in court
and often cited in judicial opinions. While there is a great deal of research on
the use of expert testimony generally, its reliability and its effect on jury decision-
making, there is very little academic theorizing of these issues as they pertain
to religion.
Historical facts about, and opinions on, religion may be produced at trial
or, even more problematically, simply introduced by a judge, based in his own,
or his clerks’, research, when preparing his decision and writing his opinion. As
an example of the latter, in the well-known nineteenth century polygamy case,
Reynolds v. US, 20 the first Supreme Court case interpreting the meaning of the
Free Exercise clause, the Chief Justice of the United States used the writing of a
prominent nineteenth century polemicist, Francis Lieber, to support his opinion
that “[p]olygamy has always been odious among the northern and western
nations of Europe, and, until the establishment of the Mormon Church, was
almost exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and of African people.” 21
18. The Supreme Court observed in Abington v. Schempp, 374 US 203, 1963, that while
public schools in the US were prohibited from requiring Bible reading at the start of each school
day, schools might teach “objectively” “about” religion in classes such as history or literature.
Religious studies has flourished at the college and university level in the US in both public and
private institutions since that time, but teaching about religion at the elementary and secondary
school levels remains very undeveloped in the US, both because of popular understandings of
the religions clauses that diverge from that of the Court and because primary and secondary
schools are controlled locally and therefore subject to local politics. In practice, politically
distinguishing between teaching religion and teaching about religion has been almost impossible
to achieve. Americans prefer children to learn about religion—and sex—at home.
19. See discussion of such a view expressed by the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit in Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Prison Religion, 217-18.
20. 98 US 145, 1878.
21. 98 US at 164.
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The Reynolds decision famously held that the Free Exercise clause of the First
Amendment protects belief absolutely but not practice; that is, in the words of
the Court, that “Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opin-
ion [by the First Amendment], but was left free to reach actions which were in
violation of social duties or subversive of good order.” The Chief Justice quoted
its expert in religion to support its conclusion that polygamy was contrary to
good order: “Professor Lieber says, polygamy leads to the patriarchal principle,
and which, when applied to large communities, fetters the people in stationary
despotism, while that principle cannot long exist in connection with monog-
amy.” Lieber also linked the necessity of monogamy to theories of white racial
superiority. 22
In Reynolds, then, the US Supreme Court found it not error for the trial
court to have charged the jury that there must have been a criminal intent,
but that if the defendant, under the influence of a religious belief that it was
right—under an inspiration, if you please, that it was right—deliberately mar-
ried a second time, having a first wife living, the want of consciousness of evil
intent—the want of understanding on his part that he was committing a
crime—did not excuse him, but the law inexorably in such case implies the
criminal intent. 23
This harsh dismissal of the force and relevance of religious motivation, inter-
estingly diverging from the insanity defense, for example, remains good consti-
tutional law in the United States today. Reynolds was recently affirmed in
Employment Division v. Smith, in which the Court held that religious motivation
to use peyote did not provide a constitutional justification for violation of laws
regulating controlled substances. 24 In fact, even outside of constitutional cases,
in spite of much rhetoric and the passing of numerous laws designed to insulate
religiously motivated persons from prosecution for actions they have taken as
religious persons, US courts are generally reluctant to excuse people judicially
from compliance with the law on the basis of religious justification. 25 And yet,
22. Legal efforts to end polygamy among Mormon communities continues today. See, for
example, concerning the 2008 raid by Texas authorities on the Yearning for Zion Ranch owned
by the Fundamentalist Latter Day Saints, Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, “Reforming Culture:
Law and Religion Today” in Robert Orsi, ed., Cambridge Companion for Religious Studies,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011.
23. 98 US at 162.
24. See Employment Division v Smith 494 US 872, 1990. Speaking phenomenologically,
legal philosopher Cathleen Kaveny has suggested in the context of conscience clauses for health
care workers that religious motivation might be productively analogized to disability under the
Americans with Disabilities Act. Patricia Townsend Meador Lecture. Vanderbilt University,
3 january 2011, http://calendar.vanderbilt.edu/calendar/2011/03/01/patricia-townsend-meador-
lecture-m-cathleen-kaveny-jd-phd.131703
25. For a discussion of these issues in the Canadian context, see Benjamin L. Berger,
“Moral Judgment, Criminal Law and the Constitutional Protection of Religion,” Supreme
Court Law Review, 40, 2008, 513, 537-550.
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while this apparently secularizing inhibition is explicit under the Reynolds and
Smith decisions, American law continues to be implicitly influenced by religious
anthropologies in a wide range of areas, including the definitions of crime and
the imposition of punishment, laws regulating social services and business, and
the law of marriage, although much work has been done to expose the religious
assumptions and structures underlying the administration of family law in the
US. 26
To illustrate the use of expert evidence about religion in the contemporary
American courtroom, I will discuss briefly the expert evidence in what are
termed, in US constitutional terms, a Free Exercise case and an Establishment
Clause case. The two cases are interesting in evidence terms, not in doctrinal
terms. The epistemological difficulties considered in this article cut across doctri-
nal differences about the proper interpretation of the First Amendment.
In Warner v. Boca Raton, 27 I was one of five religion experts called to testify
about the nature of the practices at issue in the case. 28 The plaintiffs in the
Warner case were a group of families whose relatives had been buried in a
municipal cemetery in Boca Raton, Florida. Cemetery regulations limited memo-
rialization to small flat plaques, flush with the ground, regulations that were
designed to facilitate lawn maintenance and the movement of heavy equipment
for grave-digging but which were also consistent with trends in cemetery design.
Over a couple of decades in the 1980’s, cemetery workers allowed several hun-
dred families—ordinary American Protestants, Catholics, and Jews—to build
small home-made “shrines” on the graves, in apparent violation of the regula-
tions. The City subsequently changed its policy and decided to start enforcing
the rules by removing existing grave decorations. The plaintiffs claimed that
both the cemetery rules and the city’s enforcement of the rules violated the free
exercise clause of the First Amendment to the US Constitution, the Florida
Constitution, and the Florida Religious Freedom Restoration Act. 29 Because the
constitutional issue was fairly clearly foreclosed by recent US Supreme Court
decisions interpreting the Free Exercise clause, the principal issue at trial was
whether what the plaintiffs had done on the graves was “religious” within the
meaning of the new Florida statute prohibiting government from “substantially
burdening the practice of religion”.
26. See, for example, Janet Jakobson and Ann Pellegrini, Love the Sin: Sexual Regulation
and the Limits of Religious Tolerance, New York, New York University Press, 2003; Mary
Anne Case, “Marriage Licenses”, University of Minnesota Law Review, 89, 2005, 1758-1797.
27. Warner v. Boca Raton, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1999.
28. See Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom, Princeton,
1995, for a description and analysis of the trial.
29. The Florida Act was one of a series of state statutes that were passed following the
declaration by the Supreme Court that the federal RFRA was unconstitutional as applied to
the states. Fla. Stat. §§ 761.01, et seq. See Boerne v. Flores, 521 US 507, 1997.
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Non-conforming grave decorations.
Boca Raton Municipal Cemetery, Boca Raton, Florida, 2004
While the Warner case is not a doctrinally significant decision, it is parti-
cularly interesting from an evidentiary standpoint because five religion experts
testified. Three academic experts in religion testified for the plaintiffs and two
for the City of Boca Raton, each offering an opinion as to whether the grave
decorations built by the plaintiffs were religious. We had five different theories
of what constitutes religion and whether the plaintiffs’ activities should be so
described. In the end, the judge developed his own theory of religion in his
opinion in the case, using his own religious knowledge as a member of a conserv-
ative Presbyterian Church as well as picking and choosing among the views of
the courtroom experts. There was no jury. Roughly speaking, the religion experts
who testified for the plaintiffs in the Warner case, a church historian, an expert
in Jewish law, and me, a comparative religion scholar, testified that the plaintiffs’
practices, although not mandated by explicit written religious law, were practices
rooted in and consistent with the religious narratives expressed by the plaintiffs
in their own testimony, such that their prohibition might constitute a “substan-
tial burden” to the plaintiffs. The religion experts for the defendants, both schol-
ars of comparative religions, offered formal structured models of religion that
would permit the judge to locate the plaintiffs’ practices along a spectrum from
“high” or “central” religious practices to “low” or “peripheral” religious prac-
tices, concluding respectively that the popular religious practices evident in the
cemetery “shrines” were “low” or “peripheral,” and therefore did not rise to a
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level that deserved legal protection. The judge developed his own standard,
partly through a blending of the theories of the two experts for the defendants,
ultimately finding that the plaintiffs’ practices were motivated not by religion
but by what he called “purely personal preference.” His decision was upheld
on appeal.
Non-conforming grave decorations.
Boca Raton Municipal Cemetery, Boca Raton, Florida, 2004
The judge in the Warner case made clear in his opinion that he considered
himself to be as much an expert in religion as any of the witnesses, notwithstand-
ing his lack of academic training in religion. Indeed, he revealed a deep and very
Protestant skepticism about the significance of the history of Christian burial
offered by the church historian as well as the methods of Jewish legal practice
employed by the Orthodox rabbinical expert, substituting instead his own lay
evangelical understanding of the importance of Christian history and how scrip-
ture should be read. In doing so, he arguably refused to implement the evident
intent of the Florida statute to protect religious persons from laws that impinge
on their religious practices, whether conventional or not. 30 Whatever one’s posi-
tion on issues of doctrine or statutory interpretation, the judge’s use of expert
testimony in the Warner case is troubling from an evidentiary standpoint. Reli-
gious studies as a field is deeply divided on defining religion. Indeed one might
say it is constituted centrally by an argument over what counts as religion and
whether what counts as religion can be understood apart from a particular politi-
cal consensus on the issue. 31 If each American is entirely free to make her own
decision about her religious standpoint and activity, in what sense can religious
expertise be legally “scientific”, or even “assist” the trier of fact?
30. The Definitions section of the Act defines an exercise of religion as “an act or refusal
to act that is substantially motivated by a religious belief, whether or not the religioius exercise
is compulsory or central to a larger system of religious belief” § 761.03(3).
31. Classic articulations of this problem include Jonathan Z. Smith, “Religion, Religions,
Religious”, in Mark Taylor, (ed.), Critical Terms for Religious Studies, Chicago, University of
Chicago Press, 1998.
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The Warner case, like the Reynolds case discussed above, concerned what is
known in the US as a free exercise issue, that is, the legal question of when a
person is exempt from laws that apply to everyone else because her action is
religiously motivated. Experts in free exercise cases are usually testifying about
a particular religious tradition, supporting a party’s claim to be acting consist-
ently with her religious tradition. The testimony of all of the expert witnesses
in the Warner case revealed the gap that may open in these cases between the
expert’s description of a particular religious tradition and the witness’ own ver-
sion of that tradition. The capacity of the court to adjudicate the orthodoxy of
the witness’ practices is deeply problematic in a country in which religion is
disestablished and the free exercise of religion is guaranteed.
The other religion “clause” in the First Amendment is the Establishment
Clause. Cases brought under the Establishment Clause address the question,
when is the government prohibited from acting because its actions constitute an
unconstitutional “establishment” or favoring of religion? An unconstitutional
religious establishment has been understood to occur not only when government
officially institutionalizes a particular church as the official state church, but also
in a range of situations in which government can be understood to “endorse” one
religion over another, or even religion over non-religion. Academic experts in
establishment clause cases are testifying to the religiousness or secularity of activ-
ities of the government (or of agents of the government). Most Establishment
Clause cases involve schools because historic anti-Catholic prejudice in the US
has made schools a focus of political and constitutional concern, but there also
are a set of cases concerning directly the possible religiousness of symbols or
practices of elected officials, such as government recognition of Christmas as a
national holiday or the placing of images of the Ten Commandments in public
places as a gesture of moral exhortation. 32
Schools in the US are managed primarily at the local, rather than the national,
level. In a recently highly publicized case, a federal district court in Pennsylvania
held that a local school board’s recommendation to its students that it consider
Intelligent Design 33 as an explanation for the fossil record, was unconstitutional
under the Establishment Clause. 34 The legal charge in Kitzmiller was that the
local school board was “establishing” religion within the meaning of the First
32. See, for example, Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 US 668, 1983.
33. “Intelligent design”, in its simplest sense, refers to the belief that the beauty and com-
plexity of the natural world is itself evidence of an intelligent designer, undercutting an argu-
ment from natural selection. That observation has, at various times in history, been offered as
one proof for the existence of God. Intelligent Design as a movement came into being in the
United States in response to the teaching of evolution in public school biology classes and in
the wake of the failures of earlier anti-evolution efforts.
34. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District, 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 2005. See also this
author’s article, “Being Human: Negotiating Religion, Law, and Science in the Classroom and
the Courtroom”, in Elizabeth Mertz, (ed.), The Process of Translation: Law, Social Science,
and New Legal Realism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011.
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Amendment when it recommended that its students read Of Pandas and
People, 35 a book promoting the theory of intelligent design (ID) as an expla-
nation for human origins superior to Darwinian evolutionary theories. Many
expert witnesses at the trial testified concerning intelligent design. Echoing the
standard for scientific evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence, Judge Jones,
the judge in the Kitzmiller case, found that intelligent design is not science but
religion because science is defined by methodological naturalism and ID lacks
an empirical foundation in the scientific method.
Judge Jones’ opinion, in contrast to the judge in the Warner case seems to
use the evidentiary rules respecting expert testimony to determine what constitu-
tionally counts as religion, rather than starting with a definition of religion. That
is, if it does not meet the Daubert standard, then it must not be scientific and
therefore must be religion. He also found, though, that ID is not merely not
science. It is a deliberate fraud. ID, while it markets itself as science, is really,
according to the expert witnesses and the judge, “stealth” religion— religion
that dare not speak its name.
For most academic scholars of American religion, ID, and the question of its
“real” purpose, would be considered an artifact of American populism and of
the US culture wars. Whether ID is religion within the meaning of the Establish-
ment Clause is a different question. To teach ID in science classes may be to teach
scientific nonsense, but, one might argue, it is not therefore to teach religion.
Proponents of ID are anti-establishment in the sense of being against big govern-
ment and big science. Some of them are striving to make space for a biblical
account of human origins. But ID has no specific religious content. Its propo-
nents have learned that lesson from the fate of creationism. 36
Opponents of ID are exactly the elites about whom many Americans are
suspicious. Judge Jones’ decision in the Kitzmiller case was underwritten by the
various experts who testified at the trial. Among them was a Christian theologian
who described ID as bad theology, the product, in effect, of religious ignorance.
It was not just bad science, he said, it was also bad religion.
A brief review of the facts in the case. On October 18, 2004, the Kitzmiller
defendants, the Dover Area School Board of Directors, 37 had passed the follow-
ing resolution by a 6-3 vote:
Students will be made aware of gaps/problems in Darwin’s theory and of other theories
of evolution including, but not limited to, intelligent design. Note: Origins of Life is
not taught.
35. Percival Davis and Dean H. Kenyon, Of Pandas and People: The Central Question of
Biological Origins, Dallas, TX: Haughton Publishing, 1989.
36. Creationism was also promoted as a substitute for teaching evolutionary theory in US
classrooms, and also successfully challenged in the courts under the Establishment Clause.
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 US 578, 591, 1987.
37. The Dover area school district encompasses an area around York, Pennsylvania, west
of Philadelphia.
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A month later, the Dover School Board announced that, beginning in January 2005,
teachers would be required to read the following statement to students in the ninth
grade biology class at Dover High School:
The Pennsylvania Academic Standards require students to learn about Darwin’s The-
ory of Evolution and eventually to take a standardized test of which evolution is a part.
Because Darwin’s Theory is a theory, it continues to be tested as new evidence
is discovered. The Theory is not a fact. Gaps in the Theory exist for which there
is no evidence. A theory is defined as a well-tested explanation that unifies a
broad range of observations. Intelligent Design is an explanation of the origin
of life that differs from Darwin’s view. The reference book, Of Pandas and
People, is available for students who might be interested in gaining an under-
standing of what Intelligent Design actually involves. With respect to any theory,
students are encouraged to keep an open mind. The school leaves the discussion
of the Origins of Life to individual students and their families. As a Standards-
driven district, class instruction focuses upon preparing students to achieve profi-
ciency on Standards-based assessments.
While ridiculed by many academics, 38 the statement seems a genuine, if
somewhat untutored and unscientific, in the professional sense, effort, to explain
to students how science education works and how they intend to handle local
concerns about the teaching of evolution and the proper role of families in
child raising.
The plaintiffs in the Kitzmiller case were a group of parents challenging the
school board’s required statement as an unconstitutional establishment of reli-
gion. The plaintiffs argued that Intelligent Design, while presented by the school
board as simply another scientific theory explaining the known facts about the
fossil record, was in fact a religious program strategically masked as a scientific
one. Among the experts supporting their theory about the essentially religious
and non-scientific nature of the school board’s actions, and of the unambiguous
distinction between religion and science, was John Haught, professor of theology
at Georgetown University. Haught expressed the view that ID is “an essentially
religious idea.” 39 Explaining that intelligent design can be traced genealogically
to a line of Christian theology beginning with Thomas Aquinas, Haught concluded:
38. For example, at a plenary lecture on August 20, 2010 at the International Association
for the History of Religion XX World Congress, at which this author was present, Susan
Haack, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Miami, and a leading philosopher of science,
described the Dover School Board’s statement as “poorly written, ill-informed, stupid, [and]
sneaky”, and offered the opinion that “the theory of evolution is indisputably logically incom-
patible with a literal reading of the book of Genesis.” Susan Haack, “Cracks in the Wall, A
Bulge Under the Carpet: The Singular Story of Religion, Evolution, and the US Constitution”
(unpublished but provided to the author in manuscript).
39. Many academic scholars of religion today would be skeptical of the notion that there
are any ideas that are “essentially” religious, believing rather that what counts as religion
depends on the context. See, among others, Jonathan Z. Smith, Relating Religion: Essays in
the Study of Religion, Chicago, 2004.
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ID tries to squeeze what is undeniably a supernatural cause, intelligent design, into
an explanatory slot where only natural causes are methodologically permissible...
Throughout the modern period scientific method has refused to use categories such
as purpose, God, intelligence, value, meaning, importance, etc., and has attempted to
understand all phenomena in a very limited impersonal and indeed physical way...
Theologically, moreover, major traditions maintain that if God influences and inter-
acts with the created world it cannot be in the same way that physical causes operate.
From the point of view of the most prominent theologians, therefore, not only is ID
poor science, it is also appalling theology.
“Major” traditions and “the most prominent” theologians have worked it
out, according to Haught. No “good scientist” would indulge in professional
speculations on ultimate causes. No good theologian would believe in miracles
or assert that God intervenes in history. Genealogy, according to Haught, estab-
lishes the essential nature of things. 40
Haught is a liberal theologian. The practice of having “liberal” theologians
either testify or be cited in American courtrooms as experts in religion is long-
standing. Paul Tillich has been cited for the proposition that religion is about
“ultimate concern” and therefore conscientious objection to serving in the mili-
tary should be respected not only if it is founded in the traditions of a pacifist
church, but also if it is founded in a non-religious philosophy that takes the
place of religion for an individual, US v. Seeger. 41 In another evolution case,
McLean v. Arkansas, 42 the well-known liberal Protestant theologian, Langdon
Gilkey, served as an expert witness against the creation science statute in Arkansas.
He also used the Protestant Christian theology of Paul Tillich to define religion
and to critique creation science. 43 The fit between liberal theology and science
is very cozy. In contrast, others have argued that ID, as Colin Jager explains, is
another way to be religiously modern, rooted as it is in romantic rather than
enlightenment sensibilities. 44
How should courts determine when grave decorations are religious or
whether schools are teaching religion in the absence of politically sanctioned
authorities who are charged with these tasks? In the US the answer to these
questions is singularly underdetermined and therefore singularly subject to
continuous political negotiation. There is no public office charged with officially
managing religion and education is subject to the direction of popularly elected
school boards.
40. Much of modern thought would, of course, be disqualified under this test.
41. 380 US 163, 1965.
42. 529 F. Supp. 1255 (ED Ark. 1982).
43. Langdon Gilkey wrote a book about his experiences. Creationism on Trial: Evolution
and God at Little Rock, Charlottesville, University of Virginia Press, 1985.
44. See, for example, Colin Jager, The Book of God: Secularization and Design in the
Romantic Era, Piladephia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006.
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Conclusion
Legal comprehension of religion in the US is largely inchoate. Combining a
political attitude of respectful and neutral support for religious freedom with a
mandate not to favor any religion is very difficult, as states around the world
are discovering. Individual Americans are understood to be entirely free to define
their own religious lives as they please. When law appears to give religiously
motivated persons special privileges over those who are not so motivated or
forbids government establishment of religion, courts are left with the difficult
problem of line drawing. 45 It is not clear that academic expertise in religion
properly has any useful role to play in court. 46
I served as an expert witness in an Establishment Clause case several years
ago (Americans United v. Prison Fellowship Ministries 47). I testified to what I
thought to be a fairly unremarkable opinion concerning the evangelical religious
character of an in-prison rehabilitation program, InnerChange Freedom Initia-
tive, operated by Charles Colson’s Prison Fellowship Ministries, an opinion that
would be shared, I believed, by most other scholars of American religion. Indeed,
I believed that they would so regard themselves. I gave no opinion on the consti-
tutional question before the Iowa court. Opinions on legal issues are usually
reserved for the judge in American courts. 48
In the district court, the defendants in the AU v. PFM case unsuccessfully
tried to prevent my testifying by challenging my qualifications to be an expert
under federal law. 49 But, more significantly, in the appeal of the decision to the
US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, they successfully challenged the
admissibility of my testimony, arguing that the Constitution prohibits an Ameri-
can court’s hearing from any expert in religion. They explained: “It is well estab-
lished, in numerous other contexts, that courts should refrain from trolling
through a person’s or an institution’s religious beliefs. The district court abused
its discretion, as the professor’s testimony is not relevant.” 50 While the Court of
Appeals substantially affirmed the trial court’s decision in all important respects,
45. There are American First Amendment theorists who believe that common sense under-
standings of religion can do this work with sufficient precision to continue to support the work
of the courts in interpreting and implementing such laws. See, for example, Kent Greenawalt,
Religion and the Constitution, Vols. I and II, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2006.
46. I do think the academic study of religion has a useful role to play in education.
47. Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries
(AU v. PFM), 432 F. Supp. 2d 862 (SD Iowa 2006).
48. See W. F. Sullivan, Prison Religion: Faith Based Reform and the Constitution, Princeton,
Princeton University Press, 2009, for a discussion of the PFM case.
49. Their argument was that I lacked relevant expertise because I had not visited the prison
and interviewed the prisoners but instead had based my opinion on reading the documents
produced by Prison Fellowship describing the program, including manuals and lesson plans, as
well as on my knowledge of American religious history.
50. Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. Prison. Fellowship Ministries,
509 F. 3rd 406, 2008.
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including the trial court’s conclusion that the state’s contract with the prison
program violated the Establishment Clause, the Court held that my testimony
was not constitutionally “relevant,” as a matter of evidentiary law, because such
expertise is inherently establishmentarian.
The AU v. PFM opinion finding the admission of my testimony to be error
will not end the use of religious experts in US courts because it has little preceden-
tial value with respect to evidentiary decisions by other district court judges. But
the anxiety expressed reflects common American prejudices against expertise
in religion matters and in favor of individual decision-making about religion,
prejudices rooted in the long history of US disestablishment and intensified by
broader concerns about expert-witnessing in US courts.
Today in the US, religious freedom increasingly means that individuals define
religion for themselves—and that no religious expert has any public authority,
legal or political, to override that reality. The result, perhaps ironically, is that the
rejection of one form of “establishment,” that is established religious authority is
rejected in favor of another form of “establishment,” that is increased power in
the political establishment to define religion. One can see that dynamic at work
in the PFM v. AU case. Expert testimony was rejected in favor of judicial limits
on religious practice in the name of individual freedom. 51 Governments may
make laws that make it difficult to do what your religion requires of you but
they cannot tell you what your religion is. 52
Winnifred F. SULLIVAN
University at Buffalo Law School
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Abstract
This article examines how academic experts contribute to the discussion of court
cases concerning the defense of religious freedom in the US Based on a study of
relevant cases in which the scope of the first amendment has been debated, and
relying on her own experience as an expert in some of these court cases, the author
addresses the question of who is legitimate to define what counts or not as religious.
She also studies the ambivalent relation of the American public to academic expertise.
While some consider the role of experts as necessary to the formation of fair deci-
sions, others view it as an obstacle to the expression of people’s will.
Key words: academic and judicial expertise, First Amendment, religious freedom,
elitism, secularity.
Résumé
Cet article étudie comment les experts universitaires contribuent au règlement des
affaires portées devant les tribunaux américains concernant la protection de la liberté
religieuse. À partir de certains cas significatifs où les limites et la portée du premier
amendement ont été débattus, et en s’appuyant sur des éléments tirés de son expé-
rience d’experte sollicitée par les tribunaux, l’auteure traite de la question de savoir
qui est légitime et habilité à définir ce qui est religieux ou non religieux. Elle étudie
également le rapport ambivalent du public américain avec l’expertise, à la fois consi-
dérée comme garantie d’une décision éclairée et comme potentiellement contraire à
la volonté populaire.
Mots-clés : expertise juridique et universitaire, premier amendement, liberté reli-
gieuse, élitisme, laïcité.
Resumen
Este artículo examina la contribución de los expertos universitarios a la regulación
de los asuntos llevados ante los tribunales americanos en relación con la protección
de la libertad religiosa. A partir de un estudio de ciertos casos significativos donde
los límites y el alcance de la primera enmienda han sido debatidos, y apoyándose
igualmente sobre elementos tomados de su experiencia de experta solicitada por los
tribunales, la autora trata la cuestión del saber que es legítimo e idóneo para definir
aquello que cuenta como religioso o no religioso. Ella estudia también la relación
ambivalente del público americano en relación con las pericias, a la vez consideradas
como garantía de una decisión ilustrada y como siendo potencialmente contraria a
la voluntad popular.
Palabras clave: pericias jurídicas y universitarias, primera enmienda, libertad reli-
giosa, elitismo, laicidad.
